

Imagining the Free Republican Party of Turkey: Keeping the Political Elites in Power

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Turkey experienced two major attempts at creating a multi-party system in the inter-war era. The Free Republican Party, founded in 1930, came into being as the ruling nationalists' political response to the growing discontent in the society at a time of economic crisis, political exclusion and top-down westernization. This essay discusses various interpretations of the Free Republican Party and will conclude that there is a consensus in focusing on the nationalists and party founders in explaining the party and that other social groups who contributed to local branch development are still not effectively represented in the party accounts.

Explaining the Free Republican Party (FRP) seems an easy task for social scientists of Turkey because of its short existence, from August to November 1930. Furthermore, the identity of FRP deputies as nationalists in parliament makes it easier to describe who the founders were, their changing relationship with the president and the Republican People's Party (RPP) officials and the closing of the party through the decision of its founders. It is much harder, however, to ask why the FRP was founded, who supported it and why it was closed so quickly.

This essay discusses the interpretations of these questions through various sources¹ and supports the conclusion that the interpretations of the FRP converge on two aspects. First, the narrative is heavily concentrated on the activities and perceptions of the party founders as well as of the nationalists. Second, suggestions related to the role of other social groups and social processes are difficult to verify due to lack of empirical evidence.

Why Was the FRP Founded?

One of the two major approaches to understanding the establishment of the FRP is to work through structural models. Authors who see the issue from the structural perspective stress the fact that there was considerable resentment within society, stemming from the one-party regime, the westernization agenda and the economic failure of the 1920s.² However,

the most popular interpretation focuses on the existence of the one-party regime that became more authoritarian as the first decade of the Turkish Republic unfolded. By 1930, the ruling RPP had become heavily bureaucratized³ and, essentially, had been transformed into a clique with few connections to society⁴ other than its contact with power-hungry local partners.⁵ On the level of national politics, the parliament had become ineffective and failed to balance government power.

The weakening of the RPP's ties with society and its unprecedented power caused resentment among the people and within the RPP itself.⁶ While Zekeriya Sertel concludes that Turkey was not far from dictatorship,⁷ Ahmed Ağaoğlu, who represented the liberal wing in parliament, severely criticized the existing political structure in the country in his books and reports.⁸

Another source of bitterness in society was the pace and the range of the nationalist modernization program.⁹ Toynbee accurately summarized the dichotomy inherent in the Turkish modernization scheme as early as 1926:

Seldom has a more rapid transformation been wrought upon the face of a nation than in the new Turkey. But the majority of the population of the interior can neither read nor write and have little communication with the outside world ... Superstitions still dominate the lives of people, with serious effects upon the national health and welfare. Life in inner Anatolia is still primitive and unchanged.¹⁰

Within this social context, after "the complete domination of the political scene was assured"¹¹ in 1925, the nationalists accelerated the reform process by including in it people's everyday lives. They started with the symbolic hat reform, which was followed by the closing of religious centers such as dervish lodges and shrines. In 1926, the Civil Law Code based on the Swiss model completed the secularization of family law, making polygamy and religious marriages illegal.¹² In 1928, Islam ceased to be official religion of the state and the alphabet was changed from Arabic to Latin. Thus, the nationalists challenged the identity of ordinary people,¹³ implementing their westernization agenda from above.¹⁴

In addition, discontent in society also stemmed from the economic failure of the Turkish Republic. The drought of 1927-28, the restrictions

of the Lausanne Treaty on raising tariffs, the lack of foreign capital and the Ottoman debt repayments are given as reasons for this attitude.¹⁵ Poverty was widespread. At the same time, the economic policies of the government were seen as corrupt as trade monopolies were supported for the sake of the private accumulation of capital.¹⁶

The Great Depression is also cited as a reason for the severe economic hardship that Turkey was undergoing.¹⁷ As agricultural prices declined, Turkey's trade deficit increased since her export portfolio was composed primarily of agricultural goods. Lack of credit and high taxes¹⁸ resulted in many bankruptcies.¹⁹ According to these accounts, resentment within society rose steadily as a result of unsuccessful government economic policies that were unable to cope with the crisis, or because of the direct effects of the Great Depression.²⁰

From this point on, classical FRP history shifts from structural explanations to the motivations of President Mustafa Kemal in initiating the FRP. One of the simplest interpretations views the new move of the president as a means to facilitate criticism of the government by opening up free debate in the parliament in which the social issues would be addressed more efficiently.²¹

While for many this decision can be explained by Mustafa Kemal's belief in the democratic ideal,²² others argue that it was a result of the urgent need the president felt to reform the Republican People's Party.²³ An approach that sees the new party as a mere tactical tool goes further, claiming that the president's real purpose was to undermine the power of İsmet İnönü, who had started to boast his own group of supporters in parliament and within the bureaucratic camp.²⁴

Yet another approach presents the president as viewing the party in light of his long-term commitment to ensuring that the Turkish Republic would be accepted in the Western world. This acceptance would take the form of Turkey's entrance to the League of Nations or,²⁵ in broader terms, incorporation into the political structure of Western Europe, a goal toward which the modernization efforts of Turkey had been directed since the days of the *Tanzimat*.²⁶ Mete Tunçay described this as "the will of Turkey to be respected by the West."²⁷

Çetin Yetkin, who centers his thesis on the concept of Republic, proposes a different version of the "European model" approach. In the second edition of his book *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* [Free Republican Party], he argues that if Turkey is a Republic, then by definition it should

be ruled by the sovereign people, realizing itself in a multi-party system.²⁸ Therefore, there was a need for a party to function as a balancing power, as balance distinguishes democracy from a dictatorship. That is why Mustafa Kemal initiated the Free Republican Party.²⁹

Several contemporary authors argue that regarding nationalist reforms, Mustafa Kemal's aim was to learn to what extent the revolutionary measures had penetrated society and to see the extent of the opposition to the revolutions and the Republic.³⁰ In other words, the new party was promoted as an experiment. On the other hand, he was also concerned about the increasing social resentment due to economic failure. Aware of the discontent (although not of its degree),³¹ Mustafa Kemal had no alternative but to found the FRP in order to channel the opposition into parliament.³²

How to Explain Mass Support for the Free Republican Party

From the day its foundation was announced to the public, enthusiasm rose for the new party. Hundreds of letters were sent to Fethi Okyar, the founder and leader of the party, and to the newspapers of the opposition expressing good wishes for the new party and/or applying for membership even before any local branches had been established.³³ Within the first week, membership rocketed to 10,000.³⁴

As Fethi Okyar admits in his memoirs, he was surprised by the mass support the party received within such a short time.³⁵ Şevket Süreyya, an eyewitness who wrote extensively on the early Republican era, makes the same point: what was interesting about the Free Republican Party was not the founding cadres or its policy choices, but rather the excitement that it brought to society.³⁶

The three forms of resentment stemming from political, social and economic causes were expressed in distinct supporter base explanations. For instance, those who stress the authoritarian nature of the one-party regime point out that there was no political freedom in the country. Workers were not allowed to organize³⁷ and Muslim intellectuals, Communists and Republicans who were not in line with the RPP had no chance of political representation.³⁸ The party center in Ankara exerted power over local branches, as well as over society in general, through mechanisms such as the party inspectors (*parti mutemedleri*). Favoritism and injustice in the courts were rampant.³⁹ As a result, people who felt

their goals were being ignored gathered around the FRP and formed its grass-roots power base.⁴⁰

The second approach in the literature directs its attention to people who opposed the Republic and its reforms. According to this narrative, the ranks of the FRP were filled with reactionaries who opposed the reforms, whose shrines and lodges had been shut down.⁴¹ So, the story continues, the FRP leaders were unable to control the local branches in an environment where reforms had as yet no proper roots in society. This position is strongly defended by contemporary authors affiliated with the RPP.⁴²

This "people against the Republic" approach has been altered slightly by other authors, both from a functionalist and a mechanistic class point of view. According to the functionalist perspective, people who were not happy with government practices one way or the other had the weapon of religion at their disposal. Religion acted as a mechanism to unite the people, devoid of its content.⁴³ In such a mechanism, even a Byzantine priest could find his place.⁴⁴

The so-called "class perspective" glorifies the social role of religion by positing an elective affinity between the religious opposition and the lower classes, including petty-traders, the peasantry and workers who were not happy with the economic policies of the government.⁴⁵ Hence, the second approach in the relevant literature points to religion, either for its content or its function, as the main factor determining the identity of the supporters of the FRP.

The last approach concerning the supporters of the Free Republican Party relies on an interpretation of economic history. According to this approach, Fethi Okyar was aware that the supporters of the new party were not reactionaries, but rather people who had been hurt by the economy as a result of the Great Depression.⁴⁶ For this reason, despite the liberal program of the party that echoed the demands of merchant capital and the outward-looking bourgeoisie, the FRP received the support of the poor masses.⁴⁷ At the same time, part of the bourgeoisie, unhappy with the practices of the trade monopolies,⁴⁸ participated in the cadres of the Free Republican Party.⁴⁹ The conclusion drawn by many authors is that the FRP was supported by classes whose interests were often contradictory.

The Closing of the Free Republican Party

In explaining the closing of the Free Republican Party, the relevant scholarly literature mostly concentrates on the political elite, such as Mustafa Kemal, the leaders of RPP and the founders of the FRP.⁵⁰ According to authors suggesting that the president was responsible for the failure of the FRP, in an open letter to the public Mustafa Kemal declared⁵¹ that he would be impartial with regard to both parties and made private promises to Fethi Okyar.⁵² However, after clashes between the police and Free Republican supporters during what is termed the İzmir incidents, he changed his mind.⁵³ His new position was made clear in an open letter to the press: the illegal behavior of the mob against the police force in İzmir would not be tolerated and he would take over the effective leadership of the RPP when the term of his presidency ended.⁵⁴

From the president's point of view, the municipal elections were the last straw in revealing the dangers the new party presented. The elections made two lasting impressions on the psychology of Mustafa Kemal. First, seeing the irregularities in the elections, he became convinced that the country had entered a period of anarchy, beginning with the incidents in İzmir. Second, he was offended by the mass support the Free Republican Party received. That his party, which was the continuation of the National Defense Organizations that had won the War of Independence, was losing ground indicated a lack of confidence in Mustafa Kemal himself.⁵⁵ He concluded that the FRP was no longer helpful to the political system of the country and signaled its closure.⁵⁶

The second interpretation pertaining to Mustafa Kemal is that he was forced to act against the FRP because of mounting pressure from the Republican People's Party. Yunus Nadi and Falih Rifki, journalists who identified with the RPP, were particularly active in this campaign.⁵⁷ Yunus Nadi, in his famous open letter to Gazi,⁵⁸ declared that the revolutionaries were strong enough to defend the revolution by themselves.⁵⁹ Falih Rifki went further. Despite warnings from İsmet İnönü not to write against the Free Republican Party, Falih Rifki started a violent press campaign against the new party.⁶⁰

The Republican People's Party was no different than its press. Many authors argue therefore that the ruling People's Republican Party was unable to accept the existence of a party that threatened its hold on power and used every means available to eradicate that threat.⁶¹ The impartial

positioning of Mustafa Kemal had not gained support within the ruling circles. Within the ranks of the RPP, the so-called Group of 40 (*Kırklar Grubu*) was founded specifically to fight the FRP.⁶² The first act of the group was to reject the president's National Block idea, according to which all candidates would be chosen by the president, while the parties would be represented according to votes they won in elections.⁶³ As a result, interpretations centered on the president claim that he had no alternative left but to allow the FRP founders to close the party.

The Republican People's Party is thus blamed for the failure of the FRP.⁶⁴ The RPP had enjoyed a long supremacy, facing no challenges since the days of Progressive Republican Party (1925–26), but the situation changed suddenly with the foundation of FRP. The FRP quickly gained mass support throughout the country, as became clear at the İzmir meeting of the party. Thousands gathered to hear Fethi Okyar's speech and he was hailed as the second savior of İzmir. As a result, panic spread among the supporters and the local branches of the RPP.⁶⁵ Worst of all, there would be municipal elections in a few months that would presage the power of the two parties in the general elections the following year. RPP officials deeply feared that they would lose these elections.

The RPP's high officials decided to fight the Free Republican Party with all possible means. At this critical point, the bureaucratic apparatus that was the natural ally of the RPP called out for help.⁶⁶ Starting with the İzmir incidents, pressure on the Free Republican Party supporters came to a head in the municipal elections.⁶⁷

The police, the military forces and the civil administrators of various cities and towns utilized a variety of mechanisms to prevent the Free Republicans from winning the elections. They omitted the names of those affiliated with the FRP from the voting lists, prevented Free Republican supporters from enter voting places, hid ballot boxes and stole FRP votes.⁶⁸ Predictably, the Republican People's Party won the elections in a great majority of places although the FRP did score some successes.⁶⁹

The last round in the termination of the Free Republican Party took place in the parliament. Fethi Okyar's request to discuss the irregularities in the municipal elections was initially welcomed by the RPP. However, the ruling party had second thoughts about the debate in the parliament.⁷⁰ The session was turned into one questioning the legitimacy of the Free Republican Party. Fethi Okyar, with two other members of the party in the parliament, tried to deflect accusations⁷¹ related to his own political life

and his party that arose from the many speakers of the RPP.⁷² When this extraordinary session of the parliament ended after 13 hours, the proposal of the Free Republican Party had been rejected and the party was left moribund.

The last agent responsible for the closing of the party cited is the Free Republican Party itself. According to the memoirs of the founders, because of unintended or unforeseeable events, if the FRP had wanted to continue its political life, it would have had to fight the president himself.⁷³ The Gazi made this point clear in a conversation with Fethi Okyar, saying that he would be in charge of his party and "you would be in charge of yours."⁷⁴ FRP parliament members found it impossible to pursue their initiative, given the power of Mustafa Kemal in society and their close relationship with him and allegiance to his principals.

The second interpretation referring to the FRP blames the grass-roots power of the party outside the parliament for the party's failure.⁷⁵ The first sin of the FRP was to be involved in mass-politics by activating opposition outside the parliament with the aim of coming to power. If the FRP had stayed within the limits of parliament, all would have been well.⁷⁶ However, as Tunçay points out, Fethi Okyar had been unable to understand what had been communicated to him between the lines in his agreement with Mustafa Kemal.⁷⁷ For this reason Hasan Rıza Soyak, who had been very close to Mustafa Kemal in those years, criticized Fethi Okyar for not acting as initially agreed; Mustafa Kemal wanted an opposition in the parliament in order to influence the government in a positive manner, not a tangible political alternative. Therefore, to discredit the power outside the parliament, the classical view was that the "parliament members of the FRP could not control the local organization of the party and it was filled with reactionaries."⁷⁸

Concluding Remarks

The interpretation of the FRP related to the three questions discussed above has two major shortcomings. First, the authors cannot provide sufficient proof or empirical information to defend their premises, arguments or conclusions. Thus, the resentment both at the elite and societal level for the founding process, the mass support given by specific social groups and the role of various actors in the closing process remain assumptions, rather than well-defended arguments. For example, with

regard to the establishment of the party, the texts do not cite any concrete examples such as arrests or riots to illustrate the oppressive character of the one-party regime. Nor do they present any expressions of resentment from the Islamic masses at the westernization agenda. The reference to social resentment at economic difficulties due to the Depression is also a general statement to be analyzed carefully. Not every social class suffered from the Depression, so discontent did not rise in all segments of society automatically.

The same inadequacy is also visible in the explanations of the mass support for the FRP. The texts fail to give names able to document political agitation in local branches, or to show that the party was filled with Islamists, communists or other "undesirable" people. The voices of merchants as another social category are also absent in terms of group action.

The lower classes, such as the peasantry and the working class, are brought into the picture in some respects, although their existence and demands are given very limited space. The local press, where there is extensive information about the western Anatolia tour of the party and the grass-roots development of FRP, is hardly cited in the narratives, thus squandering the chance to build a more solid picture of FRP supporters.

In the closing stage of the party, the interpretations come together, giving priority to the political elite. This view is quite convincing as it sheds light on every detail communicated among the party founders, RPP leaders and the president. However, the mass support of the FRP, about which the debate between the RPP and the FRP was centered, is totally disregarded in explanations of the party's closure.

The second shortcoming of the FRP as a research subject is the incoherent nature of the accepted explanations. While the authors are capable of listing all interpretations for the founding of the party, its mass support and the closing stage, these are always separate explanations, unable to produce an interpretation that explains the process as a whole. For example, a classic FRP approach might emphasize the negative effects of the Great Depression on Turkey by increasing the discontent among country's citizens, move on to Islamic society to explain the mass support and end with Mustafa Kemal's changing position as an explanation of the closure of the FRP. Thus, the lifespan of the party is neither constructed nor imagined as a whole, which makes it difficult to connect the party to any specific interpretation.

In short, the history of the Free Republican Party was seen as an enterprise of the ruling nationalists and left no room for other social actors. Consequently, the focus on political elite prevented any satisfactory account of the party's local branches, its members outside the parliament or the identities of its supporters. I would like to suggest that future studies on the Free Republican Party concentrate on the peripheral history of the party supported by new archival sources. This, I hope, will be an important step in freeing the narratives of one-party regime in Turkey from the monopoly of the ruling nationalists.

NOTES

I would like to thank Şevket Pamuk who encouraged me to work on the Free Republican Party and assisted me greatly throughout the project.

1. I have mainly concentrated on two types of sources for this essay. While the first type covers the memoirs of party deputies and of the literate-elite strata, the secondary sources are incorporated into the analysis via works done on the FRP and on the Ottoman-Turkish modernization. Literature about the development of political parties in Turkey has also been taken into account.
2. Abdülhamit Avşar, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası – Bir Partinin Kapatılmasında Basının Rolü* (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1998), pp.36–46; Walter F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), pp.55–63.
3. Eric J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p.185.
4. Esat Öz, *Tek Parti Yönetimi ve Siyasal Katılım (1923–1945)* (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1992), p.103.
5. Şevket S. Aydemir, *Tek Adam* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2nd Edn. 1966), Vol.2, p.386.
6. Hakkı Uyar, *Tek Parti Dönemi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Istanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık, 1998), p.119.
7. Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım* (Istanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 2nd Edn. 1977), pp.190–91. For an opposite view, see Donald E. Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Processes in the Turkish Transformation* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939), p.162.
8. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Serbest İnsanlar Ülkesinde* (Istanbul: Sanayi Nefise Matbaası, 1930), pp.32–8. For the full text of the report, see Hasan Rıza Soyak, *Atatürk'ten Hatıralar* (Ankara: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1973), Vol.2, pp.493–9.
9. Cemil Koçak, "Siyasal Tarih (1923–1950)," in Sina Akşin (ed.), *Türkiye Tarihi* (Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 1987–95), Vol.4, p.106; Avşar (1998), pp.39–41.
10. Arnold J. Toynbee and K.P. Kirkwood (eds.), *Turkey* (London: Ernest Benn, 1926), pp.243, 257.
11. Zürcher (1993), p.180.
12. Ibid., pp.180–81.
13. Avşar (1998), p.41. For a discussion about a possible period of reaction, see Toynbee and Kirkwood (1926), p.243.
14. Emre Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 9th Edn. 1995), p.153.
15. Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), p.59; Weiker (1973), pp.59–63; Çetin Yetkin, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası: Atatürk'ün Başarısız Demokrasi Devrimi* (Istanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, 2nd Edn. 1997), pp.26–7.

16. Muzaffer Sencer, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Sosyal Temelleri* (Istanbul: Geçiş Yayınları, 1971), p.142; Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), p.64.
17. The best work on the connection of the FRP and the Great Depression can be found in Selim İkin and İlhan Tekeli, *1929 Dünya Buhranında Türkiye'nin İktisadi Politika Arayışları* (Ankara: Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi, 1977), pp.154–84.
18. Hilmi Uran, *Hatıralarım* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1959), p.221.
19. Avşar (1998), p.43.
20. Walter F. Weiker, "The Free Party of 1930 in Turkey: Loyal Opposition in a Rapidly Modernizing Nation" (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1962), pp.41–4; Yetkin (1997), pp.31–2.
21. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları* (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 2nd Edn. 1969), pp.40–45; Cemal Kutay (ed.), *Üç Devirde Bir Adam* (Istanbul: Tercüman Tarih Yayınları, 1980), p.416.
22. Kutay (1980), p.393; Selçuk E. Onulduran, "Political Development and Political Parties in Turkey" (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Southern California, 1973), p.80; Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*, trans. Metin Kırıtlı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1996), p.279; Weiker (1973), p.55.
23. Mete Tunçay, *T.C.'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması (1923–1931)* (Istanbul: Cem Yayinevi, 3rd Edn. 1992), p.254.
24. Tekin Erer, *Türkiye'de Parti Kavgaaları* (Istanbul: Ticaret Postası Matbaası, 1963), p.47; Süreyya İlmen, *Dört Ay Yaşamış Olan Zavallı Serbest Fırka* (Istanbul: Muallim Fuad Gücüyener Yayinevi, 1951), pp.29, 36–7.
25. This view is unique to Sina Akşin. See Hüsamettin Ünsal and Hıfzı Topuz (eds.), *Cumhuriyetin Beş Dönemci* (Izmir: Sergi Yayınları, 1984), p.29.
26. Mehmet Kabasakal, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Parti Örgütlenmesi, 1908–1960* (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınları, 1991), p.118; Öz (1992), p.102.
27. As an example to support this thesis, one can cite Mustafa Kemal's pleasure at the news coming from the European newspapers upon the founding of the Free Republican Party. See Kutay (1980), p.492.
28. Yetkin (1997), p.96.
29. Ibid., pp.96–100.
30. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politika'da 45 Yıl* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984), p.118.
31. Soyak (1973), p.405.
32. Zürcher (1993), p.185.
33. These newspapers were *Yarın* and *Son Posta* in Istanbul, *Hizmet* and *Yeni Asır* in İzmir. For a similar view, see Avşar (1998), pp.32–5.
34. Avşar (1998), p.97.
35. Kutay (1980), p.388.
36. Aydemir (1966), p.385. Information about the local branch development and supporter base of the party is limited. For the identities of organizers in a few locations and local branch development in Samsun, see Weiker (1973), pp.120–23.
37. Sertel (1977), p.191.
38. Avşar (1998), pp.130–32. Avşar argues that non-RPP Republicans were the backbone of the party, but his point remains unproven. See also Yetkin (1997), p.123.
39. Yetkin (1997), p.30.
40. Yetkin points out that the proposed aims of the party had no direct link with the class base of its supporters. That is why he added women as a category to his list of supporters of the FRP, although the examples cited are few. See Yetkin (1997), p.122.
41. Webster (1939), p.109; Weiker (1973), p.117.
42. Uran (1959), pp.216–20; Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Çankaya* (Istanbul: Doğan Kardeş Matbaacılık, 1969), p.465.
43. Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası* (Ankara: İmge Yayinevi, 1993), p.161.

44. The analogy belongs to Çağlar Keyder, see *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 3rd Edn. 1993), p.123.
45. Bekir B. Özipek, "Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Olayı" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Hacettepe University, 1991), p.165.
46. Yetkin (1997), p.133; Weiker (1973), p.150.
47. Timur (1993), p.160.
48. Sencer (1971), p.142.
49. Yetkin (1997), pp.108-9.
50. All three agents are discussed in Avşar (1998), pp.161-85; Yetkin (1997), pp.210-44; Weiker (1973), pp.141-51.
51. Ağaoğlu (1969), pp.20-23.
52. Kutay (1980), pp.409, 426, 434.
53. Avşar (1998), p.123.
54. Yetkin (1997), pp.210-13.
55. Ağaoğlu (1969), pp.70-73.
56. Avşar (1998), pp.198-9.
57. The press of the RPP, which had a considerable effect on the politics of the day, became more robust against the FRP after a letter from Mustafa Kemal related to the İzmir Incidents. For an argument blaming the pens on both sides, see Avşar (1998).
58. "Gazi" is one of the titles of Mustafa Kemal that was frequently used in the early 1930s instead of his name.
59. Avşar (1998), p.123.
60. Atay (1969), pp.464, 573.
61. For an opposite view, see İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), Vol.2, p.230.
62. Ağaoğlu (1969), pp.48, 90.
63. Avşar (1998), pp.140-41, Weiker (1973), p.146.
64. Yetkin concludes that the FRP experience turned into a struggle between M. Kemal and the RPP, see Yetkin (1997), p.244.
65. Many branches of the Turkish Hearths, which were organizations semi-autonomous from the state and the ruling party, are reported to have crossed to the side of the FRP. See Samet Ağaoğlu, *Babamın Arkadaşları* (Istanbul: Nebioğlu Yayınevi, 1958), p.146.
66. Yetkin (1997), pp.183-5; Weiker (1973), p.145.
67. Avşar (1998), pp.146-8, 157-8; Ağaoğlu (1969), pp.67, 142-5, 167.
68. For the irregularities in the elections in İzmir, see Serap Tabak, "Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası ve İzmir Vilayeti" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Ege University, 1990), pp.139-43, 151-3.
69. Despite the methods of maladministration, the FRP won the municipal elections in more than 30 locations. See Weiker (1962), pp.160-63.
70. Avşar (1998), p.182.
71. Ibid., p.184.
72. Kandemir, *Serbest Fırka Nasıl Kuruldu - Nasıl Kapatıldı* (Istanbul: Ekicil Tarih Yayınları, 1955), pp.123-7.
73. Ağaoğlu (1969), p.92; Kutay (1980), p.521.
74. Soyak (1973), p.444.
75. Karaosmanoğlu (1984), pp.118-20. For an opposite view, see Yetkin (1997), pp.232-3.
76. Soyak (1973), pp.411, 425-6, makes this point, although his approach deserves more careful attention given his close relationship with M. Kemal. Avşar (1998), p.197, lists the "mistakes" of the FRP in a similar way: participating in the elections and having no party journal. Ağaoğlu (1969), pp.34-6 also makes these arguments. Weiker (1973), pp.141-2 adds being unable to control the local branches.
77. Tunçay (1992), p.254.
78. For a typical example, see the speeches of RPP deputies in the debate over the irregularities in the municipal elections in Ağaoğlu (1969), pp.165-6; Yetkin (1997), pp.232-3; Weiker (1973), pp.141-2.