

Harris's larger charge regarding the Palestinians and their role in Lebanese events. Simply put, Lebanese events are inseparable from regional events. It is also important to mention this regardless of how one might feel about Arab nationalists, Marxists, and such.

It would be intriguing to find out what Harris might make of Palestinian and Lebanese Salafis working together against Lebanese Shia (Amal, Hizbollah) with foreign (Arab and Western) financing and other types of material support in collaboration with Lebanese Sunni and Christian elements. Would Harris find those threats to Modern Lebanon internal or external? Could he imagine 2012 Lebanon without Saudi, American, Qatari, Syrian, Israeli, Iranian or French political and military influence? Does he envision the March 14th camp shunning foreign influences and fighting for an independent Lebanon against the March 8th camp that wishes to surrender Lebanon to foreign influences?

Harris has written a powerful book without glaring assertions and speculations, through chapter 5, but not including its last two chapters, 5 "Toward Catastrophe, 1967-1975," and 6 "Cultural Breakout."

CEM EMRENCE, *Remapping the Middle East: Modernity, Imperial Bureaucracy and the Islamic State* (London and New York: IB Tauris, 2011), Pp. 208, \$ 90.00 cloth

REVIEWED BY CORINNE BLAKE, Department of History, Rowan University, Glassboro, NJ; e-mail: [blake@rowan.edu](mailto:blake@rowan.edu)

In *Remapping the Middle East: Modernity, Imperial Bureaucracy and the Islamic State*, Cem Emrence posits an interesting analytical framework for late Ottoman history: using the concepts of historical trajectory and path dependency to analyze how different parts of the empire transitioned to modernity. Proposing a new multicausal methodological framework, he suggests that "understanding the nineteenth-century Ottoman world and its legacy should start from exploring the regionally-constituted, network-based, and path-dependent historical trajectories" (4). In the introduction, which should explain this approach in more depth, Emrence argues that during the nineteenth century three separate historical trajectories developed in three regions of the central Ottoman Empire—the coastal areas of western Anatolia and the Eastern Mediterranean, the interior of Anatolia and Greater Syria, and the frontier border regions in eastern Anatolia, Iraq, and Arabia. The trajectory in each region was initiated and sustained by different forces, such as the economy, local politics, and contention that also shaped its long-term outcome.

After establishing the theoretical framework in the introduction and explaining why North Africa and the Balkans are not included in his analysis, in chapter 1 Emrence critically reviews the historiography of the late Ottoman period. He argues that it developed in three waves after World War II, beginning with a modernization approach that emphasized the impact of the West and Ottoman attempts to transform the empire in a Western image. This scholarship stressed top-down Westernizing measures and “reactionary” opposition to these reforms, attributing political agency to the Westernized bureaucrats who attempted to implement defensive modernization. After detailing the development and well-known shortcomings of modernization studies, Emrence examines the macro models, stressing capitalism and the integration of the empire into world markets that became more popular from the 1970s. These “second wave studies” focused on the rise of a non-Muslim merchant class, agrarian patterns, workers and peasants, and Ottoman responses to economic incorporation in order to analyze late Ottoman history through a “conflict paradigm” of the empire versus the West and the non-Muslim bourgeoisie versus the Ottoman bureaucracy (26). Emrence reviews problems with these macro models before proceeding to the development of revisionist scholarship centered on bargaining perspectives from the 1990s. This third approach restored agency to Ottoman bureaucrats and provincial elites, revealed “the brokered nature of Ottoman state formation” and emphasized the development of imperial ideologies as a means of establishing political legitimacy (28). After analyzing the limitations of such bargaining accounts, Emrence argues for a new methodology: a trajectory framework that allows for variation within the empire and offers more multicausal explanations.

The next three chapters explain this new approach, each describing one of the three regional trajectories in more depth. In chapter 2, Emrence details the coastal trajectory that began to prevail in western Anatolia and eastern Mediterranean coastal regions, including their commercial hinterlands, in the nineteenth century. It was sparked by the increasing incorporation of these regions into the European-dominated world economy and the rise of a mostly non-Muslim middle class, who increasingly achieved ideological hegemony for their modernization agenda. As a result, the coastal regions became very prosperous, cosmopolitan, and more dependent on the world economy than the rest of the Ottoman state, but, dominated by a strong middle class, these regions also experienced economic conflict manifested as communal tensions and violence as well as class struggles.

In chapter 3, Emrence argues that interior regions of the empire, by contrast, were not shaped by foreign intervention and the expansion of global markets. Instead, Ottoman centralization in the mid-nineteenth century initiated the trajectory in these areas, creating a powerful urban Muslim bloc tied to the state through imperial education and service in the Ottoman bureaucracy and military. As the state managed to crush rural leaders, urban families gained control of the countryside and became absentee landowners. Merchants in the interior benefited from the improved infrastructure and increased public security, allowing them to develop and dominate regional trade, supplying bulk agricultural goods as well as manufactured products, such as textiles, to urban markets in the empire. These developments integrated

these regions into the Ottoman state and led to patrimonial tensions among elites as well as popular opposition from artisans and the poor, who expressed their discontent in a series of bread riots.

Chapter 4 focuses on the trajectory of the frontier regions, where Ottoman bureaucrats initially sought to increase security, then attempted to bring these remote regions under tighter central control through administrative changes and state education. Nonetheless, frontier leaders continued to collect protection money on trade and pilgrimage routes and to earn money by attacking settled communities, smuggling, and other methods. Faced with numerous administrative problems as well as sustained local resistance, the state ultimately concentrated its efforts on negotiating with frontier leaders, with varying degrees of success. Some nearer frontier regions, such as parts of Transjordan and northern Iraq, were brought under stronger state control, but large-scale rebellions for local autonomy broke out in more distant frontier regions such as Yemen. These frequent rebellions, which were often supported by outside powers, tended to mobilize followers through confessional and religious discourses.

After establishing the trajectories' characteristics, in chapter 5 Emrence examines how the intense political changes that occurred between 1908 and 1922 transformed each region. Although people in coastal areas generally supported the Young Turk revolution, workers used the opportunity to strike, and the urban elite made demands for "more representative and efficient institutions," leading the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to look for other allies (107). By 1920, nationalist movements and/or imperial powers had gained control of many coastal regions, homogenizing them through population transfers, but the middle class continued to prosper under the new regimes. People in the interior regions, by contrast, were less enthusiastic about the revolution, worrying about their future under the CUP. Some leaders began to express their opposition through Arabism, which became the prevailing ideology in the region after the defeat of the empire, even as the imposition of British and French mandatory rule forced leaders to adopt more localist positions. In the frontier regions, the Young Turk revolution led to a series of major rebellions. While rebellions by some groups, such as the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, were crushed, uprisings in far frontier regions, such as Yemen and the Najd, brought increased autonomy. After the war, Armenian and Kurdish nationalists in the near frontiers were defeated and incorporated into Turkey, and the intermediate regions became part of British or French mandates; many leaders in the far frontier regions, however, succeeded in achieving autonomy or even independence.

In the conclusion, Emrence outlines the advantages of using a "spatial, path-dependent and comparative" regional trajectory framework (122), and he asserts that this approach offers new insights into issues such as Arab nationalism, Ottoman citizenship, the collapse of the empire, and problems of successor states after the war. Since the book was written "to set up an ambitious research agenda" (128),

Emrence concludes by offering suggestions as to how the historical-trajectory approach could be employed by historians to explore comparisons within or between Ottoman trajectories and between overland empires. This stimulating book should interest social scientists and Ottoman historians; given its clear summary of late Ottoman historiography, skillful synthesis of the literature, and suggestions for new research, it would also be a positive addition to reading lists in Ottoman history courses, especially graduate courses. Since the regional trajectories are explained in short chapters of about twenty pages each, the ideas are sketched out very broadly, leaving questions about how well the trajectory framework would hold up in more detailed studies. Some historians may also question the extent to which the complexity of historical development and human experience fits into this type of broad explanatory model. The book was not written as a comprehensive empirical study, however, and it should achieve its stated purpose: sparking debate in late Ottoman studies and inspiring new research.

ALAN MIKHAIL, ed., *Water on Sand: Environmental Histories of the Middle East and North Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Pp. 352, \$ 24.95 paper

REVIEWED BY E. ROGER OWEN, Department of History, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA; email: [eowen@fas.harvard.edu](mailto:eowen@fas.harvard.edu)

As in most other spheres of academic study, the Middle East lags behind that of global environmental history, at least in its present, much more theoretical and comparative form. But now, Yale University's Alan Mikhail, in this superbly edited work, has done much to fill this large gap, as well as to provide a readable and widely sourced text that can be used with confidence by anyone eager to teach the subject at the high school or college level. While, like all such collections, it contains contributions of uneven quality, the overall standard is so high, so thought provoking and drawn so much from recent research as to resist most of the usual types of criticism directed towards edited works.

Needless to say the subject is an extraordinarily large and multi-dimensional one, embracing as it does not only questions of history, science, demography, transport and ecology but also power, empire, government, ideology and, in the case of Karim Makdidi's history of the notion of environmentalism in modern Lebanon, social class. And then there is the question of methodology, involving, as Mikhail explains, an examination of what is best described as a dialectical relationship between populations and environment together with what Nancy Reynolds wisely points out in her presentation of the narrative developed in support of Nasserite Egypt's mighty High Dam project, a concentration on process rather than a simple minded balance-sheet approach that views everything as either good or bad for the

Copyright of International Journal of Turkish Studies is the property of International Journal of Turkish Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.